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Abstract: This paper examines corporate governance (CG) characteristics and relates them to earnings management (EM) 
behaviours in the context of a large emerging sector, Islamic banking industry. Main differences are found with regard to 
philosophical aspects, including objectives of the bank, natures of contract involved, key players in theCG practice as well as 
the relationships between the players. We verified that these aspects provide strong justification for an additional layer in the 
CG of an Islamic bank being the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB). The mechanism and tools for the effective implementation 
of CG are relatively the same as the conventional system. 
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1. Introduction 
Banking activities tend to be more diversified and 
complicated due to the globalization of financial services, 
which affects the risk profile, both quantitatively or 
qualitatively; banking active management can be achieved 
through the contribution of: 
 Good governance; 
 High degree of transparency; 
 Disclosure of information; 
 Having a minimum level of risk-based capital 
requirements. 
All these factors contribute to active risk management as a 
neseccery, even if not adequate for any financial system to 
strengthen the public's confidence in it, achieve its stability 
and, at the end, to find general standards for good governance 
to realize integration in the international financial system. 
The International Standards of Banking Supervision, 
issued by Basel Committee in the first and second version, 
has not taken into account Islamic banks, but the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) in Malaysia -which is 
considered a reference framework institution that most Arab 
central banks ratify the standards and instructions it issues 
regarding Islamic Banks- develops special standards for 
Islamic Banks in the field of good governance rules, capital 
adequacy and transparency. That was because Basel 
Committee had not done that, especially that the IFSB is 
exerting prompt and significant efforts to set general rules 
and standards concerning the safety and stability of Islamic 
Banks under the rapidly increasing Islamic financial services. 
The IFSB achieved the capital adequacy standard for 
financial institutions (except for insurance institutions) that 
provide only Islamic financial services. This standard has 
filled a very important gap in the field of risk management 
and capital adequacy for Islamic Banks. 
The primary version of good governance rules has been 
completed. Work is going on to achieve the supervisory 
review according to the second pillar of Basel 2, and for 
transparency and market control according to the third pillar 
of Revised Basel Framework for risk-based capital adequacy. 
It is worth mentioning that Basel Committee is concerned 
with developing a comprehensive conception of effective 
banking supervision for across borders financial operations 
as a priority due to the risks they contain. Basel Committee 
abides by enhancing cooperation with states that are not 
members in the Committee, and with the institutions which 
have similar concerns to Basel's topics, on top of it which is 
the IFSB, with which there's serious cooperation that's 
expected to be fruitful in the different fields of mutual 
concern by Basel Committee and the IFSB: 
 The good and sound governance which plays an 
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important role in achieving the safety factor at the level 
of banks and the financial stability as a whole. 
 Basel capital framework contribution to achieving the 
good governance in the banking sector. 
 Basel's achievement in setting the good governance 
standards. 
2. Analysis and Findings 
2.1. Good Governance for Banks and Banking Supervision 
The absence of good governance in banks will result in a 
high degree of failure as it happened in large international 
corporations such as Enron, Parmlat, and Cadbury in the 
foregoing years. Each crisis had its unique story, and till now 
the surrounding circumstances of these crises have not been 
revealed, because not all the facts have been disclosed. 
Nevertheless, we can, in general, attribute a great deal of 
these collapses to the management failure and failure to 
fulfill the good governance principals which would guarantee 
security and safety for the institution. The major failure 
factors are: 
 The board of directors' failure to understand and 
evaluate the risks assumed by the institution when 
practicing its job, and failure to apply accountability to 
the CEO and the staff. 
 Conflict of interests and the members of the board, as 
well as the executive management are not independent 
so that decisions in favor of persons are passed on the 
account of others. 
 Internal auditing is either weak or does not exist; if it 
appears to be sufficient, it will be only on paper without 
any actual implementation. 
 Failure of internal and external auditing to uncover 
embezzlement, and even supporting and encouraging it 
sometimes. 
 Improper organizational structure; deals are designed in 
a way that lacks transparency and prevent market 
parties from making a clear image of the institution's 
status. 
 Moreover, the governance culture in institutions 
collapsed as they adopted unethical behavior and 
thwarted any problem-solving attempts in the institution. 
2.2. Institutional Governance in Islamic Banks supervision 
and Management 
The success, advancement and prosperity of the Islamic 
banking sector does not mean that it is immune against 
financial crises, which hit international institutions including 
traditional banks making them fail to continue and get out of 
the market; Islamic banks affect and are affected by what 
happens in international banking arena. The Gulf crisis, for 
example, led to a decrease in all banks' deposits; the storm 
reached the biggest banks including Islamic ones with good 
capital solvency and strong reputation in the Islamic banking 
arena; the breakdown of the Credit and Commerce Bank led 
to vast losses in a number of Islamic banks that managed to 
tolerate and absorb them because of their great assets, huge 
capitals and profits; they announced specifying allocations to 
cover the losses. 
This crisis proved the importance of having sufficient risk-
based capital according to the requirements of Revised Basel 
Framework for capital adequacy, on one hand, and the 
necessity to apply corporate governance in Islamic banks 
management and supervision, on the other hand. 
The institutional governance system is a wide range of 
principals, ethics, systems, procedures and policies, through 
which the institution is controlled and guided and its path is 
identified, so that to reflect the nature of the relationship 
based on the theory of deputization between three major 
stakeholders in the institution: shareholders, board of 
directors, and the executive management, where the CEO, 
according to the theory of deputization, deputizes the owners 
represented by the board of directors to manage the 
institution in accordance with the interests of the depositors 
and shareholders based on the following principals: 
 Transparency, 
 Disclosure. 
 Accountability 
The institutional governance system includes appropriate 
incentives for the board of directors and top management to 
urge them to achieve the goals in favor of the company and 
its shareholders and to continuously follow up and encourage 
the institution to achieve the optimum use of resources. 
The governance concept is relatively new, although it is an 
important element to enable banks to manage the risks they 
face when performing their job. A bank, basically, invests the 
shareholders', depositors' and investment accountholder’s 
money, which implies many risks and requires a competent 
management that can face the potential risks to avoid the 
bank their consequent losses, especially that the failure of 
any bank will lead to negative consequences on the stability 
of the banking system, the financial sector and economy as a 
whole, because the banking sector is one of the most 
sensitive and vulnerable sectors to the extent that monetary 
literatures considers it the concrete basis and the safety and 
security valve for economy as a whole. 
The Islamic banks dependency on principals that are 
deeply-rooted in the Islamic economy and built on doctrine, 
the ethical factor and real basis, does not devalue the 
importance of institutional governance in the management of 
risks that are higher than those of traditional banks due to 
subjective reasons which lay in the nature of Islamic 
investment instruments, and to objective reasons because the 
institutional, legal and regulatory environment of Islamic 
banks has not completed yet. Here, we do not underestimate 
the role of the Sharia Control Board in the bank as one of the 
most important and prominent self-management instruments 
used to judge the safety of bank's operations and the staff 
performance efficiency, and their abidance by banking 
policies and administrative procedures. 
Striving for accuracy makes us look at the Islamic banks 
experience, which is a big success story not only in the 
Islamic world, but in the entire world, as an experience that 
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still needs a further practice to complete its real picture. 
There are still a lot of controversial and undetermined points 
in the Islamic banks' work. The most important ones are: 
Interests: which some jurisprudences legitimate and some 
illegitimate. Islamic banks consider interests off-balance 
sheet items (illegitimated gains) that are to be used as 
donations, for example, upon the recommendations of the 
bank' Sharia Control Board. 
Earmarked investment accounts: they are accepted by the 
bank from the costumer after identifying the investment's 
type and nature, where the investor takes the profit and 
assumes the loss, according to the Sharia's rule: the loss vs. 
the profit. The bank gets a share from the raised profits for 
being the costumer's agent without assuming any losses or 
risks for the investment. It is worth mentioning that 
investment accounts constitute about 30% of the money that 
is available to Islamic banks. Though investment 
accountholders have better luck than others (deposit 
accountholders) in profit making arena, theyare subject to a 
wider range of risks: 
A chance for bank's management (insider dealing) to get 
information concerning a bad loan causing losses to 
investment accounts. 
An investment account gets the return on the maturity date. 
If returns are transferred to profit equalization accounts to 
reduce the return's fluctuation impact, it may cause profits or 
losses to investment accounts at the expense of the past or 
future investment account, these risks can be included within 
the securities and mutual fund industries. It is worth 
mentioning that these risks are well-known to market players, 
especially to the investment accountholders. This does not 
imply any violation to market rules, instructions and laws, 
but the Islamic banks themselves should, based on their 
awareness of these risks, adopt internal policies to deal with 
them. 
A bank's concern to implement the proper institutional 
governance principals in its management, may only protect 
the investment accountholders, provided that the risks to be 
dealt with are known and perceived at the level of the board 
of directors so that it can develop a clear detailed framework 
to tackle them. 
In this context, and in accordance with the existence of 
effective and good institutional governance structure, we 
believe that it is necessary to have an independent member in 
the board or directors to protect the rights of the investment 
accountholders. 
Identifying in advance the realised profit rate for 
investment accounts can be a solution to clinch the dispute 
concerning finding a way to protect these accountholders. 
But this is approved by some parties and rejected by others. 
The Assembly of Islamic Researches legitimates investing 
money in banks at a specified return justifying that by the 
idea that banks' investment of individuals' money against an 
in advance return is legitimated, and falls under the concept 
of agency; it, also, protects the money from corruption which 
may lead to losing the invested money's profits. It became a 
custom at some Islamic banks to give a small rate to 
investment accountholders regardless of the investment result, 
and the rest goes to the bank. Here the good institutional 
governance system should be put into effect to set an internal 
supervisory framework (internal and external audit) to avoid 
causing harm to investment accountholders, which is 
expected to be big if this group is not effectively represented 
in the board of directors. 
2.3. The Relationship Between Internal Auditing and 
Institutional Governance in Islamic Banks 
Internal auditors are concerned with monitoring the degree 
of respecting the Sharia. Considering that external auditors 
are not experts in the Islamic Sharia, the supervisory boards 
usually insist on reviewing and assuring the competence of 
internal auditor, and evaluating him/her based on: 
 To which limit the external auditor depends on the 
outputs of the internal auditor. 
 The quality of internal auditor's reports, and how their 
outputs are used by the executive management and the 
board of directors. 
 The internal auditor's work must be risk-based not 
inspection-based. The internal auditor is asked to review 
the bank's internal evaluation systems annually at least, 
in order to monitor and update them if necessary. The 
auditor also evaluates the institutions with which the 
bank deals in the context of the bank's risk management 
and assessment, and not risk pricing as that is prohibited 
in Islamic banks. 
 Internal auditor's independency. 
2.3.1. An Internal Auditor Is Required to Report annually 
and Biannuallyon 
 The bank's safety and transparency standards. 
 The appropriateness of the policies and procedures. 
 The quality the bank's management. 
 The historical database in place. 
 We highlight here the necessity to distinguish between 
auditing and inspection, which is involved in: 
 Evaluating the qualitative factors in the procedures of 
administrative practices. 
 Future horizons (the effect of present decisions on the 
bank's future status) 
 Understanding the risks that the bank is subject to. 
2.3.2. Rationales for Applying Good Institutional 
Governance Principles in Islamic Banks 
 The absence of a unified body that is a reference 
framework for all Islamic banks in the world; there are 
deep disagreements (in both opinion and jurisprudence) 
stemming from the fact that there're different 
jurisprudential schools which hinders clinching many 
disputes in the work of Islamic banks. 
 The Islamic banks' philosophy of prohibiting in-
advance specification of return and the principal of 
dividing profit and loss necessitate the provisions of a 
good institutional governance system to ensure that the 
management and the owners will not harm the 
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depositors, investment accountholders and other 
stakeholders of the Islamic finance channels. 
 The absence of Islamic accounting standards until this 
moment though the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions is taking 
confident steps in achieving a package of Sharia 
accounting standards. However, the rapid growth of 
banking sector (four times the traditional ones) and the 
development of Islamic finance and investment 
instruments leave a wide space for jurisprudence and 
the consequent disagreements among Sharia auditors 
and states. 
 Completing an appropriate organizational structure is 
difficult due to the rapid growth of Islamic banks that is 
not accompanied with similar growth in human 
resources that are qualified and experienced in Islamic 
investment. 
 The human nature which tends to prioritizing self-
interest, especially that not all Islamic banks' members 
of staff have enough religious commitment. 
2.3.3. Challenges Faced by Islamic Banks in the Context of 
Applying Institutional Governance System 
 Ensuring the requirements of rapid growth of Islamic 
banks which attracted very huge capitals that have been 
out of the banking framework; their owners kept them 
in their safes and wallets, i.e. Islamic banks' work is 
similar to land reclamation. 
 Replacing the traditional banking instruments by other 
instruments that are consistent with the provisions of 
the Sharia, because the traditional banking market 
preceded the Islamic one by many years; which makes 
difficult for the public to get used to them; it needs 
deepened awareness of the social impact and the 
economic return of Islamic investment, as well as the 
religious dimension at the same time. 
 Competition of traditional banks, especially that some 
groups, even educated ones, have a deeply rooted idea 
that there is no difference between dealing through 
interest and dealing through murabaha; some even 
prefer to borrow through interest, which makes it very 
important and pressing for Islamic bank to launch 
creative and innovative awareness campaigns. 
 No complete understanding of the Islamic banking 
system's dynamics, which need continuously 
modernization and amendment of procedures and 
practices to reduce the risks that are deeply-rooted in 
the Islamic banking system, outweighing those of the 
traditional banks. 
 Achieving integration between the good institutional 
governance system and the central bank's supervision 
on the Islamic banks according to the central bank's 
laws, the law of banks and the detailed regulations and 
instructions issued by virtue of them, along with 
internal and external auditing and the Sharia supervision. 
 Ensuring the necessary training in the context of 
qualifying the staff as a precondition to apply the good 
institutional governance system in the bank. 
 Planting commitment in Islamic banks' employees, 
starting from the similarities between them and 
traditional banks. 
 Achieving transparency and disclosure of Islamic bank's 
operations. 
 Removing the gaps in some of the Islamic investment 
instruments, from which some breaches, favoring and 
realizing the interests of some accountholders on the 
account of other accountholders. 
3. Conclusion 
Putting the good institutional governance into effect is one 
of the main ingredients, not only for Islamic banks, but also 
for political and economic reform as a whole. The absence of 
good governance in any institution threatens its existence and 
survival, which requires promoting the thought and culture of 
good institutional governance in the Islamic banking sector; 
this culture has positive reflections on the work of banks and 
ingraining the good governance mechanisms through 
developing their policies and directions in the administrative 
field, and enhancing the accountability, transparency and 
disclosure values in their work. 
Banks are the locomotive of the economic growth process. 
They, basically, invests the depositors' money, which implies 
many risks and requires a competent management that can 
face the potential risks to avoid the bank their consequences, 
and not only the bank because a bank failure affects the 
banking system as a whole. 
Engraining the concept of good institutional governance 
and good governance is a collective responsibility lays on the 
entire society. The bank's surrounding environment plays an 
important role in disseminating this culture, which requires 
cooperation from all stakeholders: government, private sector, 
media, companies, and the public. Those stakeholders should 
undertake their responsibilities in this essential and important 
topic. 
I should emphasize here on the necessity to practice clear, 
transparent and sound banking supervision rules and laws, 
and the importance of providing the required training and 
qualification to human resources according to the 
international banking rules and standards. 
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